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MOZAMBIQUE, 1960-1975: SOME COMMENTS ON THE HISTORY OF THE  
LIBERATED ZONES.

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Of course in the history of scientific discovery an effect is commonly known before its cause. And fairly often a mathematical theorem is known to be probably true before it is formally proved. (J.B.S. Haldane, "How to write a popular scientific article", New Scientist, 4 April, 1985, reprinted from A Banned Broadcast and Other Essays, Chatto and Windus, 1946).

Introduction

This essay is intended to serve two purposes. First to show that the history of the Armed Struggle continues to be the single most important starting point for analysing and understanding the current situation in Mozambique. The second purpose is to draw attention to the relationship between the reproduction of that history and the present. This relationship is bound to influence the way in which that history has been, and is going to be, researched.

However, it should be stressed that the history of the Armed Struggle is not viewed here as a sacrosanct shrine which is visited in order to repeat ritualized formulas. The approach taken here is one which starts from the premise that most of that history still remains to be studied, researched and disseminated. Implicit in this approach is the conviction that a great deal more knowledge could be gained if some of the very well known episodes were analysed by posing different questions from those that have seemed so obvious up to now.

For example, there is a clear imbalance between the long term goals and objectives of the Armed Struggle to transform the Mozambican society and the rather limited arena (in both the social and geographic senses) in which it was most effective : the Liberated Zones.

This essay does not seek to provide a new version of the history of the Armed Struggle or of the Liberated Zones. It merely seeks to point out that the certainties of past analyses must not be a barrier to exploring areas or questions which had not been raised before.

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Some of the issues raised and discussed in this paper would require entire essays, and it will therefore appear at times that one has attempted more than one can chew. Hopefully, the limitations will be perceived as an invitation to contribute to a greater and better understanding of a struggle which is still going on.

### Meaning of the Liberated Zones

This is not the place to actually carry an analysis of the various meanings that have been given to the Liberated Zones. However, they are not used here as a mere ritualistic point of departure, but as a period whose further reassessment and critical analysis can help understand better the historical process that developed after 1975.

However, in order to do this, it is necessary to go over that history outside of the preconceived molds because these are set to prove why FRELIMO won the war. Thus the recognition that FRELIMO was forged by and through the formation of the Liberated Zones ends up providing evidence for the successes of that history, but without analysing the exact limits and causes of that history. Moreover even when the contradictions that emerged are discussed, they are within the framework of the pre-determined victory of the progressive forces. It is never envisaged that on specific issues both the reactionary and progressive forces may have approached them from the wrong angle. As the essay will attempt to show this was the case in the question of attacking the cities posed by Nkavandame and his chairmen and the progressive faction of FRELIMO. The response of the latter although aimed at insisting on politics demonstrated a dogmatic preoccupation with restricting the liberation struggle to guerilla warfare and thereby failing to develop other forms of struggle and political mobilization.

For the majority of the poor peasants who participated in the war, the experience of the Liberated Zones continues to represent the vision of their future. They hold fast to it because they happened to have lived that experience and not because they feel they have to repeat some ideological slogan. (1) This in itself would be a sufficient and necessary reason for studying and analysing the Liberated Zones, but there are others. These have to do with the various characterizations that have been given to the Liberated Zones. They have to do with the capacity that has at times been attributed to the Liberated Zones in overcoming or resolving contradictions. In short they have to do with the relationship that it is legitimate (or not) to see between the history of the Liberated Zones and the current situation.

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(1) For further elaboration on this point see Não Vamos Esquecer, 1 and 4 (forthcoming, 1985).

The Liberated Zones have once been metaphorically referred to as the laboratory of the Mozambican Revolution. Like all metaphores it is only partially correct. On the one hand, it is a laboratory which witnessed a historical process that brought out conflicts and contradictions which were representative, but on the other that laboratory could not have been the site of other contradictions simply because some of the classes like the workers of the factories in the large cities, the colonial bourgeoisie and their petty allies only got to know of the Liberated Zones indirectly.

The Liberated Zones were born out of a movement to free Mozambique from colonial rule, but they ultimately covered an area which was both geographically and societally very confined. Therefore, a history of the Liberated Zones that does not take into account the transformations it was directly or indirectly provoking in the non Liberated Zones will only produce a partial and therefore distorted view of the whole historical process.

It is not necessary to repeat here the achievements that have been analysed much better and recorded in detail by more knowledgeable persons. Just for memory's sake, these are the physical ousting of the Portuguese administration from large areas; the successful introduction in these areas of FRELIMO's own administrative system which dealt with the basic problems faced by any society: land, shelter, health, education --plus, of course, protection against Portuguese military attacks.

However, because FRELIMO's administrative system was not just a replacement, and because it had among other aims, that of "putting an end to the exploitation of man by man", it raised the stakes of the struggle beyond the goal of the "hymn and the flag". The radicalization put an end to the personal schemes of Lazaro Nkavandame and his allies. But the radicalization did not just happen because some leaders wanted it, it took place because of the pressure that was brought on Nkavandame by those who were carrying the brunt of the war: the soldiers and the population -- generally speaking poor peasants-- of the Liberated Zones.

In analyzing the history of the Liberated Zones it is important to resist the temptation of seeing that whole period purely in terms of the area in which the Armed Struggle was taking place. The question of the transformations has already been mentioned, but what has to be re-studied is the question of the extension of the Liberated Zones. The terms in which Nkavandame had formulated that question was clearly unacceptable and unfeasible: attack the cities and on that basis force the Portuguese colonizers to negotiate. Nkavandame's tactic was to use the war as a means to achieve the ends of "the leaders". Having been a small property owner, Nkavandame's interests were geared toward achieving a position which would allow him to become a bigger property owner. Before 1963, he had used his savings to start small a cooperative movement and invest in the opening of small shops. At that time, and in the context of the colonial Portuguese system the rise of somebody like Nkavandame to that

position objectively challenged the notion that the positions of shop keepers had to be reserved to Whites and Indians, in that order. From his point of view therefore, the war had to be a means to achieve that transformation in a more radical fashion, hence the use he made of his position within FRELIMO's hierarchy to control the trading system set up by FRELIMO to serve the population of the Liberated Zones.

This story is very well known, but it is being repeated here because some of its aspects have not been sufficiently stressed. The appearance of a group known as the "new exploiters" represented and led by Lazaro Nkavandame was not just due to the fact that the latter had had a past which, so to speak, prepared him to assume that role. Lazaro Nkavandame represented the exact opposite of what had been the objective of those who wanted to fight for the eradication of exploitation of man by men, and yet both appeared on the scene because of the destruction of the Portuguese administrative presence in those areas.

The point to be stressed here is that the Liberated Zones were indeed the areas in which the first steps toward socialist transition were initiated. As a transition period they illustrated what other transition phases have shown through history, namely that it is extremely costly and destructive. However, the costliness and destructiveness of the process were hidden from view for several reasons, but the most important of which are the fact that both Cabo Delgado and Nyassa provinces were, during colonial rule, the two most economically backward areas of the colony. It was also this economic marginality that made it relatively easier for FRELIMO to take over from where the colonizers had left.

In trying to characterize what the Liberated Zones were, it is clear that the predominant features were those related to the overthrow of colonial rule and its economic, social and political systems. The necessity of this transformation was clearly stated in FRELIMO's program. It was also known that the fact of just taking up arms was not going to bring about those changes. Thus at the level of the conduct of the war, there were sharp divergences between those who saw the war as a means to achieve the ousting of the Portuguese, and those who saw in the war a means to achieve a transformation of the Mozambican society. For Nkavandame there was no distinction between for example the white Portuguese soldiers the white Portuguese officers or between the white Portuguese workers and the capitalist owners. Given this perspective, it was not surprising that Nkavandame considered the guerilla as means of pressuring the colonizers and speeding their departure.

Hence his insistence that the soldiers attack the colonizers where they were concentrated: in the cities. Unfortunately, when discussing this particular episode of the Armed Struggle it seems that self limiting parameters have been imposed. Nkavandame's suggestion of militarily attacking the cities could not be feasible within the perspective of a prolonged struggle aimed at

not just forcing the Portuguese to leave, but also and above all at transforming the system they had put together. The limiting parameters were: 1) consideration of the cities as purely geographical entities representing the areas with the largest concentration of Portuguese colonialists; 2) consideration of the Armed Struggle as the exclusive means of struggle against the colonizers.

#### Cities as geographical entities

By seeing the cities either as geographical entities or as the area with the highest concentration of Portuguese colonizers, it could be argued that the opponents of Nkavandame failed to analyze some of the negative implications of cutting themselves from the cities. (2) After all it was also in the cities that one found a large concentration of workers, i.e. one of the classes that was singled out in FRELIMO's program as being one of the targets of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Unfortunately, it is quite possible that one of the reasons why this analysis was not done had to do with the fact that by then the Armed Struggle had developed to the point of being seen as the exclusive means of fighting against the colonizers.

Assuming this argument is correct, it remains to be seen why the Armed Struggle came to be considered as the only acceptable means of struggling against the Portuguese. When it was decided to organize and prepare the Armed Struggle, an argument had to be made to convince the hesitants that indeed the Armed Struggle was the only means that was going to bring results. In his book, The Struggle for Mozambique, Mondlane explains why and how the Armed Struggle came to be viewed as the sole means left to Mozambicans to struggle effectively against the colonizers. At that time there had been other kinds of protests, and all of them had ended in the crushing of those who had dared revolt against the imposed conditions of living: Mueda in 1960, Xinavane in 1962 and the dockworkers' strike of 1963. It was therefore clear for FRELIMO's founders that rising against the colonizers was not sufficient; it was equally necessary to have the physical means to survive the brutal repression. Hence the logical resort to training and arming those who were rising against colonial rule.

With hindsight it can clearly be seen that what was presented as an argument for the necessity of an armed struggle developed into a tacit acceptance of the armed struggle as the sole means of struggle. With regard to the workers of the cities, this is

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(2) This point comes clearly in FRELIMO's analysis, "Os graves acontecimentos de 1968 e as divergências ideológicas ao nível da direcção", especially p.8. This analysis was made at the Central Committee Meeting of April 21, 1969, and reprinted (in cyclostyled form) for the 3rd Congress, 3-7 February 1977. A translation (by JD) of part of this document is annexed to this article.

provided by the history of FRELIMO's members working among the railway workers in Beira. From the research done so far, it is clear that the main task of those members was to recruit people to be sent to FRELIMO's war front. It does not seem that FRELIMO developed a network of agitators to work among the workers and open among the workers another front aimed at politicizing the workers.

Yet despite the negative experience mentioned by Mondlane, FRELIMO did have --in Lourenço Marques in particular-- a rather well developed underground network of members and sympathizers, but again, membership did not seem to extend beyond the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. Further research is needed to know whether or not the question of extending membership into the working class was discussed, and if it was, what were the terms of the discussions. Later on when almost all members of FRELIMO were rounded up by PIDE, one of the consequences could not but be to reinforce the idea that only the Armed Struggle could effectively deal with the Portuguese repressive machinery.

#### The Liberated Zones as an embryonic State

There is a parallel to be drawn between FRELIMO's taking over of the colonial state in 1975 and the similar process a few years before when it had to assume power, almost by default, and create the Liberated Zones. The most instructive parallel is to be found in the kind of contradictions that immediately surfaced during both phases. In both cases, there immediately developed struggles around and for control of the organs of economic and political power. With regard to the war period, the Nkavandame history and of his new exploiters is already sufficiently well known not to need repetition. With regard to post-independence, the analysis has not been done, but it is apparent that, again, the state structures did not just to work for the interests of the classes for whom FRELIMO stated they were supposed to work, just because FRELIMO said so (3). Between what was supposed to be the State and what that state actually did since 1975, there is a distance which has to be analyzed with care, rigour and patience if one is going to understand the social and economic origins of some of the difficulties and contradictions that have dogged FRELIMO since independence.

However, the parallel should not make one underplay and minimize the specificities of each period. Their importance is such that their analysis cannot be done within the scope of this paper.

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(3) On the contradiction between structures created for given objectives and the opposition of those who are supposed to make them work, see again "Os graves acontecimentos...", especially pp. 9-12.



### The situation outside of the Liberated Zones

Because of the understandable tendency to focus on the achievements of FRELIMO inside the Liberated Zones, relatively less attention has been devoted to the analysis of some of the changes that the colonial state was trying to introduce in an attempt to counter FRELIMO's advances. Moreover, for ideological and propaganda reasons it has always been easier to characterize the colonial state by the features that stood in sharpest contrasts to the Liberated Zones: the famous aldeamentos. The description that have been made by FRELIMO of the aldeamentos have not been exaggerated, but it would be erroneous to reduce the colonial state to only one of its structural manifestations.

Back in 1960, when a large number of colonies were being granted independence, the Portuguese colonizers began to think about the ways in which they were going to hold onto their colonies. In those early years, even the military were convinced that the winners of that battle would be those who manage to get the masses on their side. (4)

But, FRELIMO had obviously antagonistic ways of understanding how to win the masses and who these masses were. For FRELIMO, these meant, as stated in the program, the labouring masses. The colonial state needed an intermediary to get to the masses, and it was this intermediary class that it proceeded to work on. This intermediary group customarily referred to as the petty bourgeoisie was constituted by those social groups that could materially and marginally gain from reform measures of the colonial state: the old chiefs, the blacks and mulattoes who, by virtue of social origin, educational and/or professional achievements occupied a slightly privileged position within the colonized society.

In numerical terms, the size of this group was extremely small. It has been reckoned that out of more than 6 millions inhabitants they numbered no more than 5.000. Nevertheless, while small in numbers, this group was important in terms of the strategic role it was meant to play in the reformist schemes of the colonial state.

It should not be forgotten that before the founding of FRELIMO, one of its founders --Mfaume Nkavandame-- had been considered (and selected to go to school, learn Portuguese and be baptized "Lazaro") by some colonial administrators as the kind of Mozambican to be courted and promoted because among the colonized their relatively privileged position made them potential allies.

As small property owners (be they machamba, tractors, small shops, etc.) they constituted the easiest group to convince that reforming the colonial state was not only possible, but that it could bring them some benefits. Indeed when Miguel Murupa (at

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(4) Anthology on the History of Frelimo, CEA, in preparation.

one point FRELIMO's Secretary for Foreign Affairs) defected from FRELIMO he demonstrated, once again, how some members of the black petty bourgeoisie viewed the Armed Struggle, and, by the same token, how FRELIMO's insistence on moving beyond nationalistic objectives was jeopardizing their own goals of becoming the new propertied class.

Anyone reading the newspapers published in Moçambique, especially after 1960, cannot fail to notice the efforts made by the colonial state in order to influence this particular group to believe that changes were taking place for their own benefit. However, historically, these changes were directly tied to the process initiated by nationalist struggles in and outside of Mozambique, before and after the founding of FRELIMO. (note: In formal legal terms, for example, some of the signs of the reformist tendencies of the colonial state were the abolition of the Estatuto dos Indigenas in 1961, and later on the passing of the Nova Lei Organica do Ultramar (1963). While the stated objective was to turn everybody into a Portuguese, the discriminating practices that had been codified into law by the Estatuto dos Indigenas das Provincias de Guiné, Angola and Moçambique in 1926 and the Labour Code of 1928 continued).

#### Periodisation of the Armed Struggle

When going over the historical accounts of the Armed Struggle one is struck by at least two aspects:

1- The periodization tends to be constructed around a series of key events and personalities. This construction, in turn is used to illustrate in a linear fashion a historical sequence that in an almost irreversible fashion takes FRELIMO from its foundation through crises to victory. Concerning the appearance of contradictions, what seems more important is their resolution, usually encapsulated in a victorious event. Thus the reactionary line represented by Nkavandame is trounced at the second Congress. The assassination of President E. Mondlane is followed by a consolidation of the revolutionary line. The Gordian Knot Operation is followed by the opening of the Tete front.

2- The sudden defeat of the Portuguese, or rather their inability to finish off FRELIMO with the "Gordian Knot" Operation was one of, if not the highest point of the war. And yet the consequences have to be analysed in a more critical fashion than they have been done so far. From FRELIMO's point of view there is no doubt that having survived the Gordian Knot Operation had to be considered as a victory. However, while survival to that Operation can be attributed to the solidity of the political and ideological work that had been done in the Liberated Zones, the advances that followed the Gordian Knot did not have the same quality as the work that had been done in the Liberated Zones up to that point. Progress on the terrain was more rapid, not so much because of the quality of the political and ideological work



as because of the gradual collapse of the Portuguese military machinery, and growing inability of the colonial state to prevent FRELIMO from gaining ground among Mozambicans.

More research is required to substantiate this line of argument, but, it is not a far fetched working hypothesis. Many of the new areas into which FRELIMO entered never had the opportunity of going through the kinds of tests that both internal and external opponents imposed on FRELIMO. Entire regions, new social groups joined FRELIMO because it was slowly, but surely proving the winning side in its confrontation with the colonizers. Whereas FRELIMO's objectives as specified in its program were aimed at a social revolution, large portions of Mozambican society were satisfied to support FRELIMO insofar as it also fought for national liberation.(5)

Moreover, for many the determining test of FRELIMO's strength did not come from its ability to have survived the internal crises: it came from its ability to have survived an operation which had been heralded as the one which was going to finish FRELIMO off. Clearly, FRELIMO withstood the Gordian Knot not because its military superiority, but because the Portuguese military machine was ineffectual on the terrain that FRELIMO had forced it to do battle.

The Gordian Knot Operation demonstrated to the Portuguese colonizers that even militarily FRELIMO could not be wiped out. This realization seems to have brought about severe demoralization among the troops with the consequent results that their combativity also diminished.

For Hendriksen, FRELIMO's ability to stand up militarily to the Portuguese was a proof that after the second Congress FRELIMO was taken over by the militarists. After the failure of the Gordian Knot to achieve its stated objective, the relation of forces suddenly shifted in favour of FRELIMO therefore leading to much easier victories than those that had been achieved in the earlier period.

Although FRELIMO had always insisted that its war was going to be won among the people, masses of people flocked to FRELIMO after 1972 because FRELIMO had proved to be a match to the colonial power on the military terrain, i.e. on the terrain where the Portuguese and their allies were convinced they would defeat FRELIMO. In other words, it is not because FRELIMO was able to militarily defeat the Portuguese that one should then extrapolate that it had been due to the "take-over" of FRELIMO by militarists. And yet, that is precisely what Hendriksen does in

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(5) This particular point owes a great deal to a discussion with Wamba-dia-Wamba (History Department, University of Dar es Salaam).

his analysis. (6)

Obviously, FRELIMO's victory had been prepared in the Liberated Zones, and it is highly doubtful that FRELIMO would have survived the "Gordian Knot" onslaught had it not been for the internal strength it had achieved in those areas and the significant help it received from Tanzania before, during and after that operation.

The speed with which territorial gains were achieved after 1972 made it also more difficult to concentrate on precisely the kind of political and ideological work that had brought about the Liberated Zones. From most accounts of the history of the Liberated Zones, one gets the impression that, in comparison to the previous period, FRELIMO coasted to victory, opening military fronts after military fronts.

This raises a series of questions: does this imbalance actually reflect the fact that the war was considered over? What were the kinds of difficulties and obstacles that FRELIMO ran into? Given the comparatively easy advances after 1972, did FRELIMO feel the same kind of pressure to organize new forms of production as it had done in Cabo Delgado and Nyassa. In short, what were the obstacles in the extension of the Liberated Zones beyond their limits of 1972, while the war was going on. In other words, while President Samora stated in 1976 that the most important task was to extend the Liberated Zones, it seems clear that from 1972 to 1975 they were not extended, at least not in their economic, social, political and ideological conceptions.

These questions will be dealt with in another essay, but they are raised here because they belong to a period which chronologically belongs to the period of the Armed Struggle.

#### On conceptualizing political relations in the Liberated Zones

Political relations with the enemy.

When FRELIMO analyzed its internal contradictions, the focus of the analysis was on ideological differences, but rather little was done with regard to the material and social bases of those differences. Thus, one of the main actions of the enemy is

(6) Interestingly, FRELIMO already saw itself as a military match to the Portuguese in 1969. (Os graves acontecimentos, p. 6) More seriously, the military successes began to give more weight, almost exclusive importance to the Armed Struggle as the most important means of struggle. (see same document, p. 10) Not surprisingly, political work among the workers became secondary. Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, Greenwood Press, 1983 probably best articulates this view. However, in his case, the militarism of FRELIMO is asserted from the start as one of the consequences of Mondlane's assassination.

characterized as being "the infiltration of agents".(7) This line of argument somewhat contradicts the more solid one based on the contradiction between the introduction of administrative structures to defend people's interests and the presence in those structures of individuals (the famous chairmen, the backbone of Nkavandame's support) only concerned to advance their own interests.

However, on closer examination, the contradiction in the analysis is only apparent precisely because the ideological differences are given a moral origin. Thus, when defining and characterizing the two lines the Central committee stated that on the one hand there was a line which asserted itself and rested on the principles of waging a people's war, a prolonged struggle, as the historical way of achieving FRELIMO's objectives; and on the other hand there was the group which differentiated itself from the other on the question of tribalism, regionalism, racism, egocentrism and ambition, and through these came to separate itself increasingly more from the correct line. Summarizing the two positions, the Central Committee stated:

In clear terms, two ideological lines were confronting each other at the top leadership of FRELIMO. One, revolutionary, popular, and the other opportunistic, based on tribalism, racism and ambition, and thus, counter-revolutionary.(8)

In other words, there was a tendency to define the enemy in moralistic and populist language rather than in concrete, material terms, in terms which were centered on socio-economic relations.

#### On Conceptualizing relations with the people

However, it should not be concluded from this that the removal of Nkavandame, Gwenjere, Simango, to only cite the most important reactionary figures was carried out by a sort of a coup. Discontent among the peasants who were doing most of the war was fairly widespread against Nkavandame and his chairmen. And it is not by pure chance or coincidence that 1) Nkavandame began to avoid visiting the Liberated Zones; 2) when he called for the second Congress to take place, he insisted that it be held outside of the Liberated Zones.

In other words, the fact that FRELIMO did not draw correctly all the theoretical lessons from one of its sharpest crises did not necessarily mean that it had been unable to carry out the correct practices. It has been said that FRELIMO's main concern was to "stick" to the people. And in Cabo Delgado and Nyassa, this

(7) "Os graves acontecimentos...", p.7.

(8) Ibid., pp 12-13.

meant sticking to the poor peasants, defending them because they were the ones without whom FRELIMO, as a truly popular liberation movement would not have survived one single day.

The fact that Nkavandame's betrayal did not perturb the advances of the struggle also demonstrates that overall, the revolutionary faction had succeeded in "sticking" to the people.

It was on the basis of the resolution of this crisis that the concept of people's power began to be applied to characterize FRELIMO's style of leadership, methods of political work. However, the point of this essay is to draw attention to the fact that while the claim is correct in general, it should be qualified by pointing out that:

- 1) it referred to very specific relations at very specific moments;
- 2) people's power was far from being generally practiced in all aspects of socio-economic relations;
- 3) even in those areas, such as, for example, the relations between men and women, where revolutionary changes had been introduced, the concrete practices did not always coincide with what was called for in theory;
- 4) the conditions under which people's power was built followed a rather contradictory course, and that the correct practice did not necessarily lead to the correct theoretical deductions.

#### Provisional conclusion

With these qualifications in mind, any discussion of the current situation in Mozambique today must continue to refer to the history of the Liberated Zones, not as the sacro-sanct temple from where all remedies are going to be found, but as a central experience whose achievements are still not understood in analytical terms.

Given that the few years immediately following independence were years of exhilaration, and that the current period is rather gloomy in terms of what the future holds, there will be various attempts to rewrite the history of the Liberated Zones. To be sure, a closer study and analysis is required, but in this process the temptation should be resisted to rewrite as if everything that has been said before was completely wrong.

At another level, it is necessary to also study and analyse the reasons and causes for producing the kinds of history of the Liberated Zones that have so far been produced because they are not independent of the social forces and classes that have, since independence confronted each other over which kind of society to build in Mozambique.

## Annex

Translation of "Os graves acontecimentos de 1968 e as divergências ideológicas ao nível da direcção" (Comité Central da FRELIMO, 21 Abril de 1969)

This document, produced by the Central Committee of april 1969, was part of a series of documents which were reproduced for party members at the 3rd Congress (3-7 February 1977). This is not an official translation.

### THE GRAVE EVENTS OF 1968 AND THE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AT THE LEVEL OF THE LEADERSHIP

#### Introduction

During the last year we lived through grave events which culminated in the barbarous assassination of our Beloved President, comrade Dr. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane.

These events which took place inside Mozambique as well as outside, namely in Tanzania, seriously affected our struggle and our people.

Faced with this situation, the Central Committee considered absolutely necessary to do a global analysis of the problems, in order to establish which forces, both inside and outside FRELIMO, led to the present situation. Following a prolonged debate which brought to the surface the existing internal and external contradictions, the Central Committee decided to produce a document which would synthetise the process that led to the crisis that burst open in 1968, a document which all FRELIMO militants will have to study and analyse with great care.

The understanding of the grave moment that we have just gone through will allow us to resolve the existing contradictions amongst ourselves and direct our struggle toward increasingly more significant victories.

This will be the best way for the Central Committee, FRELIMO militants and the Mozambican people to pay respect to the indelible memory of its leader, Comrade President Dr. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane.

#### The Events

Serious events had already taken place in 1966 which generated difficulties for the progress of our struggle.

At that time our armed forces had already achieved great successes and forced portuguese colonialism to withdraw its political, administrative and commercial infrastructural organisation from large areas in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces.

These victories gave birth to, among the "chairmen" [in english and in quotation marks throughout the original text, JD] of Cabo Delgado, wrong ideas which incited attacking urban centers, at a time when the number of our forces were reduced and our fire potential weak.

The highest level of FRELIMO's leadership as well as the leadership of the Defense Department were opposed to this erroneous conception on how to carry out a People's Guerilla Warfare. They sought to show the "chairmen" and in particular to Lázaro Nkavandame that they were in the wrong.

Refusing to accept the position defined by the leadership of FRELIMO, the "chairmen" launched a campaign whose objective was to incite the people not to cooperate with the guerrilheiros. They sought to exploit the lack of essential goods such as clothes, soap, and salt, which were normally bought in the shops run by the portuguese, but which had ceased to function.

It was only through the guerrilheiro's actions and the implementation of decisions which led to the opening of small trading shops that it became possible to finally normalize the situation.

At the same time, in Niassa also serious events were taking place in 1966, but here the difficulties were essentially due to the fact that the population had not been politicized and the cadres were weak. We had not carried out correctly the political work among the masses, there had been no mobilization and organization of the popular masses which would have freed the guerrilheiros to go on with their principal mission of fighting.

Toward the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, after the great victories of 1967, there reappeared again among the Cabo Delgado "chairmen" the same erroneous conceptions on the conduct of a Guerrilla People's War. Once again, these conceptions insisted on attacking the urban centers, which according to the "chairmen" would liberate the province right away. But this time the crisis was deeper and its conceptions more serious.

In short the "chairmen"'s action was based on a reactionary and divisive plan with the intention of:

- a) - divide the people, creating contradictions between the popular masses and the liberation army and preventing political contacts between the latter and the people;
- b) - Undermine the liberation Army by inciting relaxation of discipline in order to encourage desertions;
- c) - Create a contradiction between the guerilla forces and the people's militia, considered by the "Chairmen" as their personal army;
- d) - Take over of FRELIMO's shops and run them as if they were a private business, exploiting the people.

At the same time the "chairmen" group unleashed a campaign against the leadership of FRELIMO embodied by Comrade Mondlane.



This campaign made up of insults, intrigues and calumnies, culminated with the call for a congress, and finally with the attempt to separate Cabo Delgado from the rest of Mozambique.

Simultaneously various events were taking place in Tanzania. In Dar-es-Salaam Father Mateus Pinho Gwenjere carried out a huge campaign against the leadership of FRELIMO. Using racism and instilling among the students the idea that they were an elite which must prepare itself to rule Mozambique once Independence was achieved, Mateus Pinho Gwenjere instigated a rebellion which led to the closing of the Secondary School by FRELIMO's Central Committee.

Gwenjere sent statements to the [OAU] Liberation Committee and to the Government of Tanzania attacking FRELIMO's leadership and requesting the call of a Congress. In May of 1968 Gwenjere and his group constituted of FRELIMO's deserters and other Mozambicans who had been living in Tanzania for a long time without jobs, organized attacks against the offices of FRELIMO which resulted in serious injuries to three of our comrades: JUDAS SINDI, VICENTE and MATEUS MUTHEMBA. Mateus Sansão Muthemba, membre of the CC, Provincial Secretary of the Southern Provinces to the South of the Save River, Inhambane, Gaza and Lourenço Marques, died a month later on June 6.

At the same time, Lázaro Nkavandame's group was carrying out in Tanzania a similar campaign against FRELIMO's leadership, with TANU, the Tanzanian Government and the [OAU] Liberation Committee. Gwenjere's and Nkavandame's groups made extensive efforts to incite our soldiers in the FRELIMO military training center to desert. In that Center they had even established an underground network.

Groups of gangs were created and spread all over in Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara, and along the border areas, with orders to assassinate FRELIMO's leaders. It was one of these bandit groups made up of 16 deserters and body guards of the "chairmen", which on December 22 [1968] assassinated in Nkunya, our Beloved Comrade PAULO SAMUEL KANKHOMBA.

#### The Meaning of these Events

##### The External Causes: The Action of the Enemy

In order to understand the grave events which took place in our country it is necessary to consider the successes achieved by our armed forces. The military and political victories achieved in Cabo Delgado and Niassa allow us today to have effective control over 1/5 of our country. In these large liberated areas we undertook to establish the political and administrative power of FRELIMO, and we are now developing production, thus creating the material bases for supporting the growth and extension of the Armed Struggle to our whole country. In this context, the restarting of the struggle in Tete undoubtedly constituted a

major victory for our forces because of the perspectives that it opens.

The more so in view of the fact that Tete Province constitutes today for Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and also for world imperialism, a point of important strategic significance at the political and economic levels because of the decision to build the Cabora Bassa Dam. Therefore the reopening of the Tete front constitutes a direct threat against the colonialist and imperialist project of building the Cabora Bassa Dam.

All of these successes of our forces have shown to the portuguese that they cannot be an obstacle to our forces on the battle field and that from the military point of view they are irreversibly loosing. For this reason our enemy has looked for new methods of action in its attempts to stem the progress of our struggle.

The portuguese aim at promoting the disintegration of FRELIMO's leadership, by attempting, on the one hand to generate divisions at the leadership level, and on the other by physically eliminating our leaders. These actions are carried out simultaneously inside and outside of Mozambique.

In Mozambique this effort has taken the form of a psychological campaign of insults and calumnies directed against the leaders of FRELIMO, through the radio and pamphlets.

Outside the enemy's action has manifested itself through the organization of fantoches organizations like UNAR, an organization which was created by the portuguese and taking its orders from the portuguese embassy in Malawi and headquartered there; or it infiltrates agents in our midst, as was the case of Father Mateus Pinho Gwenjere, or still, through support given to counter-revolutionaries who emerged amongst us, as is the case of the Lazaro Nkavandame's group.

In fact the political activities and propaganda campaigns of Lázaró Nkavandame and Mateus Pinho Gwenjere coincide perfectly with the portuguese passwords. The positions against the Armed Struggle and against protracted struggle, the campaign against our Comrade President, are exactly the major points of the portuguese campaign.

Nevertheless it is important to differentiate between Gwenjere's and Nkavandame's groups even if they were united and resorted both to counter-revolutionary violence.

The major characteristic of Gwenjere is to instill confusion in the minds in order to, later on, incite violence; thereby appearing indisputably as an enemy agent.

The objective of Lazaro Nkavandame is to create in Mozambique an economic system based on the exploitation of man by man. It was because of this perspective that this group transformed the shops

opened by FRELIMO into private businesses of the "chairmen", in order to shamelessly exploit the people. And it was in order to oppose itself to FRELIMO, and impose this system of exploitation that the group of Nkavandame also turned to counter-revolutionary violence leading to cold blooded murder as demonstrated by the assassination of our comrade Kankhomba.

The political line of opposition to protracted people's war and of seeking to attack the cities defended by this group since 1966 thus appears to us as a clear demonstration of an attempt to achieve a rapid victory refusing to wait till the maturing conscience of the people create the conditions for the definitive elimination of all forms of exploitation of man by man.

This means that the group of Lazaro Nkavandame by virtue of its own objective interests had already for sometime identified itself with the portuguese colonialists. Since he could not impose his interests based on the exploitation of the People, Lazaro Nkavandame allied himself with the portuguese colonialists, and at the end joined them.

This happened because the interests of Lazaro Nkavandame were identical to the class interests of the portuguese colonialists. We could also say that it was because the class interests of Lazaro Nkavandame were interests of a capitalist type, ground in the exploitation of man by man, that he moved away from, and eventually fought against, FRELIMO, which defends the interests of the popular classes and fights against the exploitation of man by man.

#### THE CONTRADICTIONS IN OUR MIDST. THE INADEQUACY OF THE STRUCTURES AND THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVERGENCIES INSIDE THE LEADERSHIP

It is necessary to be sincere and confess that the enemy succeeded in its plan to foment disintegration both inside and outside Mozambique. But we must also acknowledge that the successes of the enemy were incomparably larger outside than inside.

We see that in spite of the action of the "chairmen" and the havoc brought by Gwenjere, and in spite of the demobilization which manifested itself by the desertion of many soldiers from our camps, the fact remains that the enemy did not succeed in recapturing the initiative. At all times, even in the worst of times, our comrades at the battle front always managed to respond to the enemy's challenges.

However, outside we witnessed a general offensive of the enemy that we were incapable to stop except at the beginning of January 1969. But even then we were incapable of preventing the barbarous assassination of our commander-in-chief on the 3rd of

February 1969.

How to understand the reason behind the successes of the enemy, and more specifically, why was the enemy stronger outside than inside?

There is no doubt that the reason lay with the existence of contradictions that we were incapable of resolving in time which weakened us and prevented us from acting forcefully against the enemy.

Two contradictions appeared clearly to us:

The first: between the level of the organizational structures and the level of our struggle.

The second: conflicts inside the top level of the leadership of FRELIMO.

1) - The inadequacy of the organizational structures was the factor that incited the successes of the enemy in our province of Cabo Delgado. Our structures, and in particular the provincial structures, did not grow apace with the struggle. In 1968, our structures were basically still the structures of 1962. Yet, between 1962 and 1968 our struggle grew quite a lot. In 1962 before the armed struggle started, the principle form of our action was the mobilization and organization of the People. That is to say that the DD [Department of Defense] played an essential role.

On 25 September 1964 we launched the Armed Struggle. From then onwards the principal form of struggle became the armed struggle. The other form of action such as mobilization and organization of the people, political work in the army, production, education, health, are certainly vital, but it is no less certain that they are secondary forms of action in relation to the essential form which is the armed struggle. That is to say, these secondary forms of action must serve the armed struggle, depend from the armed struggle and must be developed in function of the armed struggle.

This means that the leaders must busy themselves primarily with the problems of the armed struggle. That is to say that the leaders must have a political and military training and the organizational structures of FRELIMO must be such that they transform FRELIMO into a true guerilla movement, that is to say, a party which carries out a people's guerilla warfare, a party which immerses itself totally in Revolutionary Armed Struggle of National Liberation.

This implied also unification of work, centralization of the leadership and concentration of powers.

Yet, we noticed that main leaders like the Provincial Secretary Lazaro Nkavandame, not only did not have any military training, but also that they were politically weak. In addition there was no unification of work neither was there centralization of leadership nor centralization of powers.

Each Department had its own representatives in the province, and although constituting aspects of the same reality that was the province, although being pieces of the same machinery, these representatives did not take decisions together, each head of department would refer directly to his superior at the national level. That is to say, there was a contradiction between the character of the organizational structures and the level of the struggle. The principles that lay behind the definition of the organizational structures no longer corresponded to the new phase reached by the struggle.

In such conditions the conflicts could only be fatal, and the enemy knew how to take advantage of this. When Lazaro Nkavandame realized that he could not impose his perspective to FRELIMO, he fought against the transformation of the organizational structures. This is the reason why the decisions to create adequate organizational structures, i.e. the decision to form the provincial committees, which were taken in 1967, was only implemented in January 1969, i.e. after the political liquidation of Lazaro Nkavandame and his group.

2) - But if this contradiction was important, another contradiction, the conflicts inside the higher level of FRELIMO's leadership played an even more important role in weakening us making us even more vulnerable to the enemy.

In actual fact inside FRELIMO and especially from the beginning of the armed struggle, there began to germinate inside the higher leadership two opposite lines.

One line defined itself and rested on the principles of guerilla people's war, protracted war, arguing that this was the historically correct path for achieving our objectives, i.e. aiming at the conquest of national independence in an independent Mozambique, free and united from the Rovuma to the Maputo and at the establishment of a popular social order.

This line required complete commitment to the popular masses and, coherent with itself, it fought against tribalism, racism, regionalism, egotism and ambition.

The other group whose line differentiated itself from the first in its positions concerning tribalism, regionalism, racism, egotism and ambition, was to differentiate itself even further from the just line because of these positions, losing completely any notion of concrete reality and failing to understand the fundamental role of the Armed Struggle for National Liberation, becoming totally incapable of distinguishing between the principal and the secondary and, more seriously, showing itself incapable of establishing a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and the friend.

Because of its incapacity, this second group finally reached the point of tacitly accepting and supporting the activities of the enemy represented by the groups of Gwenjere and Nkavandame, and

fighting thus against the revolutionary line.

In other words, two ideological lines confronted each other inside the leadership of FRELIMO. One, revolutionary, popular, and the other, opportunistic, based on tribalism, racism and ambition and therefore, counter-revolutionary.

And it was because the leadership of FRELIMO found itself divided that it could not, on the one hand implement immediately the decision to transform the organizational structures and on the other hand this same leadership being vulnerable encouraged the action of the enemy.

If, in addition we take into account the fact that part of the leadership found itself outside quite far from the action, we shall then understand why the ideological divergencies and the lack of cohesion reached a level which allowed the enemy to achieve great successes on the outside.

The study of these facts allows us to see the importance of the problems related to the formation of a clear ideological line. In fact, the two ideological lines appeared because FRELIMO had not yet defined a clear ideological line.

Our movement followed a mudled line in which coexisted the most diverse opinions, reflexes of contradictory class interests, which in turn permitted a dangerous confusion of the interests of the various classes or social strata, thereby hiding the enemy who had began to grow among ourselves from the time when the Armed Struggle had started.

If these are the reasons why a wrong line appeared, it is also important to say that the correct line appeared because a group of comrades faithful to the interests of the popular masses, respectful of collective values and fighting against individualism and personal ambition fomented by racist opportunism, comrades rooted in concrete reality immersed in the realization of principle tasks, had been capable of understanding and following step by step the transformations that were taking place continuously in our country. These were the comrades who had shown themselves capable of formulating adequate solutions to the problems of growing complexity brought to the surface by the advances of the struggle.

For this reason too, the action of the enemy inside failed and the popular and Revolutionary FRELIMO triumphed.

#### THE HISTORIC SECOND CONGRESS OF FRELIMO AND THE DEFINITION OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY.

The Second Congress was a landmark which defined the fundamental bases of FRELIMO's orientation.



There is no doubt that the Congress constituted the clashing point of the two groups whose political lines were on a collision course. The group of the wrong line had let itself be overtaken by the enemy, which focused its struggle against the leadership of Comrade Mondlane. This group supported the call for the organization of the Congress made by a bunch of "chairmen" who abusively presented themselves as the spokesmen for the popular masses. The intention of this bunch of "chairmen" was to organize a Congress with the aim of changing the leadership of FRELIMO.

However, the Congress instead of being a Congress for making elections turned out to be a Congress for redefining the base around which the politics of the Revolutionary action of the Mozambican People would be built. When they saw that their plan had failed the "chairmen" decided not to participate in the Congress.

Thus was confirmed once more the revolutionary principle which says that a revolution assumes itself the responsibility of continuously rejecting the impurities that it carries.

#### The Characteristics of our Struggle

The "chairmen" did not participate in the Congress. But the group of the wrong line which did not present itself ideologically structured, sought to generate tension and an atmosphere of suspicion among the delegates by way of intrigues.

However, the popular and revolutionary character of the Congress triumphed.

The problems of our struggle, presented in a simple, but precise and clear manner were thoroughly discussed by the delegates who were going to consolidate the revolutionary achievements of the Armed Struggle for National Liberation.

This triumph of the popular will, and in such a clear cut way is not but a consequence or a manifestation of the high level reached by our struggle in that the popular masses saw for themselves and in a natural way that the PEOPLE'S WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION was indeed the true expression of the popular will.

This means that our struggle has reached a phase in which the interests at stake are defined as class interests, i.e., in which the conflicts clearly appear as between the oppressed working classes and the exploiting classes.

Through its development and the liberation of vast areas from the yoke of portuguese colonialism, the Armed Struggle also revealed the diverse character of our Nationalist Movement, it forced the reactionary forces which had so far survived in our midst to unmask themselves. That is to say that the revolutionary armed

struggle for National Liberation, moved by its own internal dynamic, revealed to the popular masses the existence in our midst of two camps. The camp of the People's exploiters and the camp of the People.

FRELIMO embodied by Comrade Mondlane, was without a doubt, the vanguard of the organized defense of the interests of the masses and in the first place of the interests of the working classes.

Upon expressing this reality and proclaiming the eminently popular character of the Armed Struggle, the Second Congress defined the political base of the revolutionary ideology that must guide FRELIMO.

### Our Political Line

During our discussions, and basing ourselves on the decisions of our Second Congress and thanks to the efforts of all of us, in a frank and profound discussion we were able to analyse that in our leadership there existed two opposed ideological lines. One revolutionary, embodied by Comrade Mondlane and the other, opportunistic and confused, which, fortunately had been the line of a small minority.

One revolutionary, grounded in the principle that our struggle is in the final analysis a struggle between the interests of the oppressed working classes of Mozambique and the oppressing foreign and national classes; the other, opportunistic and confusing incapable of defining clearly its objectives, resting on an abstract formulation of nationalism and the objectives to be achieved.

The Central Committee calls upon all militants to increase their political work and ideological study in order to be able to respond to the tasks brought by the growing complexity of our movements.

The Central Committee reasserts that FRELIMO, the Vanguard of the Mozambican People, shall pursue without flinching the Revolutionary Armed Struggle for National Liberation, against portuguese colonialism and imperialism, as well as against the exploiting capitalist and reactionary forces which exist in the midst of the Mozambican population.

FRELIMO is fighting for the conquest of National Independence, a National Independence which is complete, economic, political, social and cultural of the Mozambican People, for the construction of a Free Mozambique united from the Rovuma to the Maputo and for the instauration of a new social order definitively freed of exploitation of man by man.

Our struggle is a popular armed struggle. It requires complete and total commitment of all popular forces of the workers in the factories, mines, harbours and railways, in the plantations, of

the peasants in the concessions, civil servants, students and revolutionary intellectuals.

Our struggle requires complete unity of all these popular forces in the defense of the fundamental interests of the oppressed working masses of Mozambique. FRELIMO is against racism, tribalism and regionalism which are contrary to the interests of the popular masses. Assured of this truth which is the invincible truth of the People THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: FRELIMO SHALL WIN, INDEPENDENCE OR DEATH, WE SHALL OVERCOME.

Translator's [JD] note: The above is only the first and most important part of the document called "Os graves acontecimentos..." The second part of the document, significantly shorter, is made up of a message from the head of the Department of Defense, at the time Samora M. Machel. It details the military aspects of the struggle.